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1 Introduction
In many contexts, groups of economic agents supply e¤orts repeatedly, thereby
giving rise to sequences of performance signals that principals can use to re-
ward e¤orts. First, most organizations assess their employeesperformance
regularly. This performance information plays a crucial role for decisions
on bonus payments, promotion and tenure. Second, in many arms-length
relationships, buyers repeatedly procure goods and services from the same
pool of suppliers. They can use past experience with these suppliers as a
basis for the conditions of future interactions. Third, school and university
teachers repeatedly observe the performance of students in their classes and
can decide how to use this information for nal grades.
Motivated by these real-world situations, we analyze the incentive e¤ects
of di¤erent approaches to rewarding repeated performance. Specically, we
ask the following questions:
1. How often should principals reward agents for good achievements?
Should there be frequent small rewards or rare large rewards?
2. Which weight should principals give to recent performance relative to
performance in the more distant past?
3. To which extent should the principal reveal the results of past perfor-
mance measurement to the agents?
We answer these questions for dynamic tournaments. Tournaments are
often used instead of contracts which condition explicitly and exclusively on
each agents own performance. In particular, organizations indeed provide
incentives with promotion tournaments.2
Specically, we consider a two-period tournament with two risk-neutral
agents with identical and known abilities. To see the incentive e¤ects of such
tournaments most clearly, we abstract from the important issue of selecting
2A well-known argument for tournaments is that they are more credible because they
are less prone to manipulation by the principal than contracts that depend explicitly on
the details of performance: When performance is not veriable, a principal may claim
that performance was low to save on performance pay. Tournaments reduce this incentive,
because the total payments to the agents are independent of performance.
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the agent with the highest innate ability for a particular task. The principal
chooses an incentive system, consisting of (i) the distribution of the prize
money across the two periods, (ii) the weight of rst-period performance in
the second tournament and (iii) the information revelation policy.
After observing the policy, the agents choose e¤ort levels in each period.
The principal observes the performance of each agent, which is a noisy mea-
sure of e¤ort. In period 1, she awards the prize (if any) to the agent with
the higher performance. Under a full revelation policy, she communicates
the performance of both agents in the rst period. Under a no revelation
policy, she neither communicates performance, nor who the winner was. In
period 2, the agents choose e¤orts again. The principal then allocates the
second-period prize to the agent for whom the weighted sum of rst- and
second-period performance is highest.3
In line with the existing literature, we consider the case that a principal
regards e¤orts in di¤erent periods and by di¤erent agents as perfect sub-
stitutes and thus maximizes total e¤ort. Contrary to most of the existing
literature, we also analyze the optimal policy for a principal who regards ef-
forts in di¤erent periods as imperfect substitutes and wants to balance them
across periods.4 We believe this is important, because excessively low e¤orts
in some period may cause large harm, which cannot even be compensated
by an extremely large e¤ort in other periods.
Apart from allowing for imperfect intertemporal e¤ort substitution, our
approach di¤ers from previous literature in three ways. First, we simultane-
ously consider information revelation, the prize distribution and performance
weights as design tools of the principal. Second, we include the possibility
that the distributions of the rst- and second-period performance measures
di¤er - e.g. in their precision - reecting heterogeneity of tasks across periods.
Third, we allow di¤erent cost functions across periods.
3In the no revelation case, the game is static. The model thus becomes a special case of
a multi-battle contest where agents compete simultaneously in a multiplicity of dimensions
(see, e.g., Clark and Konrad (2007) and Kovenock and Roberson (2010)). However, the
dynamic cross-period e¤ects which occur under our full revelation regime are totally absent
in these papers.
4Specically, she maximizes the product of rst- and second-period e¤orts, or equiva-
lently, the sum of the logarithms. Aoyagi (2010) also allows for more general objectives
than maximizing total e¤orts.
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Our contribution is threefold. First, we generalize existing results on
information revelation. Previous analysis has shown for special cases that
expected total e¤orts are lower with revelation than without when marginal
e¤ort costs are convex, and conversely for concave marginal e¤ort costs (see
Section 2). We show that this result holds for perfect and imperfect substi-
tutes, and for arbitrary rst-period prizes and performance weights.
Second, we clarify the relation between rst-period prizes and rst-period
performance weights as incentives for rst-period e¤orts. For both revelation
policies and for perfect as well as imperfect substitutes, the optimal rst-
period prize is positive only if the distribution of the rst-period observation
error di¤erence is very precise, that is, highly concentrated near zero. We
then show that for quadratic cost functions and normally distributed obser-
vation errors, this condition is never satised. Even with more general distri-
butional assumptions, the scope for using rst-period prizes is limited: For
imperfect substitutes and quadratic cost functions, the optimal rst-period
prize is never higher than the second-period prize.
Whereas the optimal rst-period prize is typically zero, the optimal weight
of rst-period performance in the second-period tournament is strictly pos-
itive for both revelation policies, general cost functions and error distribu-
tions. The optimal weight is higher the lower the adverse e¤ect of increasing
the rst-period weight on future competitive intensity is. For quadratic cost
functions, normally distributed observation errors and perfect (imperfect)
substitutes, the optimal weight is the ratio of the variances (standard devia-
tions) of second-period and rst-period observation error di¤erences.
Third, we show that the potential gains from good design are quantita-
tively important. In the normal-quadratic example, the expected e¤ort is at
least 40% higher when a principal chooses prizes and weights optimally than
when she distributes the prize money evenly across both periods without
giving weight to rst-period performance in the second period tournament.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses related
literature. In Section 3, we introduce the model. In Section 4, we analyze
the behavior of agents for given policies. Section 5 characterizes the optimal
policy. Section 6 interprets and sharpens our results in a normal-quadratic
example. Section 7 concludes.
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2 Relation to the Literature
In this paper, we focus on the optimal design of multi-period rank-order tour-
naments, in particular, on feedback policy, prize structure and weight of past
performance.5 ;6 The only paper we are aware of that simultaneously analyzes
these three design dimensions is Gershkov and Perry (2009). However, their
set-up di¤ers substantially from ours. Most importantly, after period one,
the principal merely knows whether there is a tie (arising with positive prob-
ability) or whether one of the agents has performed better (and, if so, which
agent); there is no information on the size of the lead. In many contexts,
such a coarseness of the information structure appears to be appropriate.
However, in other contexts, the principal can collect and communicate in-
formation that provides the agents with a clear picture of how much their
performance di¤ers from the performance of others. This information will
typically not be veriable in a court, but for our purposes it is su¢ cient that
the principal and the agents share a common understanding of the relation
between promotion chances and the information communicated about the
agentsrelative positions.7
Also, Gershkov and Perry (2009) assume that the relation between win-
ning probabilities and e¤orts is the same in both periods, while we allow for
di¤erences in the error structure. Finally, they only focus on maximization
of total e¤ort.
We mention in passing the substantial literature analyzing agent behavior
in repeated tournaments without addressing optimal design. Several of these
papers allow for e¤ects of rst-period play on the second period that are
determined by technology rather than, as in our case, by the principal.8
Moreover, some papers study two-period contests (rank-order, all-pay and
5Nitzan (1994) and Konrad (2009) provide surveys of the literature on tournaments.
6Another broadly related literature analyzes dynamic principal-agent relationships with
moral hazard in a non-competitive setting. Lewis and Sappington (1997) examine how
current incentives should optimally depend on past performance. Hansen (2013) and Chen
and Chiu (2013) deal with the optimal revelation policy. For reasons of space, however,
we will focus on studies that deal with repeated contests.
7With veriable information, the principal could contract directly on e¤orts, and there
would be no need to use tournaments.
8See Schmitt et al. (2004), Grossmann and Dietl (2009), Grossmann (2011) and Baik
and Lee (2000).
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Tullock, respectively) where the total e¤ort in the two periods determines
the winner of a nal prize.9 ;10
2.1 Performance revelation
Several papers analyze the e¤ect of interim performance revelation on e¤orts
in dynamic tournaments. In a setting similar to ours, Aoyagi (2010) shows
that expected e¤ort is higher with information revelation than without if and
only if marginal e¤ort costs are concave.11 Unlike in our paper, there is only
one prize, and rst-and second-period weights are the same. We endogenize
these assumptions by providing conditions under which the principal opti-
mally chooses the prizes and weights in this way. Moreover, we show that
the optimal revelation policy has the same features when these assumptions
do not hold.
Ederer (2010) introduces incomplete information about ability. The re-
sults are equivalent to those of Aoyagi (2010) if ability is non-complementary
to e¤ort.12 If e¤orts and ability are complementary, it is possible that in-
formation revelation leads to higher expected e¤orts than no revelation even
with quadratic e¤ort costs.13
9See Hirata (2014) for all-pay auctions and Yildirim (2005) for Tullock contests. Casas-
Arce and Martínez-Jerez (2009) consider a related rank-order tournament where all agents
whose total performance is higher than a certain threshold win a prize.
10More broadly related, several papers analyze the agentsbehavior in a sequence of
contests where there is a prize for winning each contest, and an overall prize to the agent
who is the rst to win a certain number of contests. Examples are Konrad and Kovenock
(2009) and Krumer (2013). Selas (2011) model is similar, the di¤erence being that there
is no prize for winning a single contest.
11Aoyagi (2010) is quite general with respect to the objective of the principal, and he
allows for partial revelation. Denter and Sisak (2013) show that e¤ort may increase with
revelation if marginal e¤orts are concave. They use their set-up to analyze the e¤ect of polls
on political campaign spending, allowing for an initial asymmetry before the beginning of
the rst period.
12Ederer and Fehr (2013) use a special case of this model with equal abilities.
13Other papers address the revelation policy in dynamic tournaments under very di¤er-
ent assumptions. For example, Arbatskaya and Mialon (2012) analyze a lottery contest
where rst- and second-period e¤orts are complements in a¤ecting the probability of win-
ning. They nd that revelation of rst-period e¤orts decreases total e¤orts. Goltsman
and Mukherjee (2011) consider a contest in which the agents either succeed or fail, and
the prize is given to the agent who succeeded more often. The optimal policy reveals
performance only if both agents fail. Zhang and Wang (2009) consider revelation policies
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2.2 The weight of past performance
Several authors ask whether there should be a bias towards the rst-period
winner in the second period of a multi-period contest (Meyer 1992, Harbaugh
and Ridlon 2011 and Ridlon and Shin 2013). Meyer (1992) considers a set-
ting similar to our case with information revelation and a single prize, but
with risk-averse agents. She shows that the cost-minimizing choice of an
e¤ort vector requires a bias towards the rst-period winner.14 Our analysis
shows that the argument for giving a headstart also holds when the rst-
period prize is much higher than the second-period prize, when there is no
information revelation, when intertemporal e¤ort substitution is imperfect
and when there is no information revelation. Finally, we provide results on
the determinants of the size of the bias.15
2.3 Distribution of prize money
A small number of papers derives the optimal distribution of prize money
across periods when there is an exogenously given technological link between
the rst and the second period, creating an asymmetry between the agents
in the second period. The e¤ects of such links are similar to those of a
positive weight of past performance in the assignment of the second-period
prize. Contrary to us, the authors focus on Tullock contests. For example,
in Möller (2012), the prize money received in the rst period does not yield
direct utility to the agents, but reduces their e¤ort costs in the second period.
Under some circumstances, the optimal policy requires a positive prize both
for the winner and for the loser in the rst period.16 In Clark et al. (2013),
the winner in the rst period may have lower e¤ort costs in the second period.
in dynamic all-pay auctions with elimination.
14Ridlon and Shin (2013) show for a Tullock contest that an analogous result still holds
for small asymmetries in the abilities of agents. However, if the asymmetry is high, favoring
the rst-period loser is optimal. In the dynamic all-pay auction of Harbaugh and Ridlon
(2011), favoring the rst-period loser is always optimal.
15Contrary to us, Meyer (1992) assumes that the size of the bias is xed ex ante rather
than a function of the performance di¤erence in period 1.
16Since agents are initially symmetric, unequal prizes in the rst period yield an asym-
metry in the second period through their e¤ect on second-period e¤ort costs. This result
is therefore similar to a positive weight on past performance in our setting.
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The e¤ort-maximizing prize structure is to give only a second-period prize.
In Clark and Nilssen (2013), second-period e¤ort costs fall with the rst
period e¤ort. The authors provide conditions under which it is optimal to
pay more than half of the total prize money in the second period.17 Apart
from the obvious di¤erence in the structure of the contest, these papers do
not analyze revelation policies, nor do they allow for imperfect substitutes.
Some papers derive the optimal distribution of prize money across stages
in a two-period elimination tournament, where only the winners of the current
period compete again in the next period. A seminal paper is Moldovanu and
Sela (2006). Because elimination tournaments have a very di¤erent structure
than our model, the results are di¢ cult to compare to ours.
3 The Model
We consider a class of two-stage rank-order tournaments. Given a xed bud-
get W > 0, a principal chooses an incentive system I, which is a tuple
(;W1; ) 2 R  [0;W ]  f0; 1g to be explained below. For given I, agents
i 2 f1; 2g choose e¤ort levels eit  0 (t 2 f1; 2g).18 The e¤ort cost function
Kit (eit) has the following properties:
Assumption 1: Kit is independent of i and di¤erentiable three times.
It satises K 0it > 0, K
00
it > 0, Kit (0) = K
0
it (0) = 0. K
000
it (eit)  0 or
K 000it (eit)  0 must hold globally.
Thus, we can write Kt  Kit. Note that we allow rst- and second-
period tasks to di¤er with respect to e¤ort costs. This reects the idea that
the e¤orts in the two periods may be of very di¤erent types. Employees
or suppliers may have to carry out di¤erent tasks in di¤erent periods; stu-
dents learn di¤erent kinds of material in di¤erent phases of their education.
Therefore, e¤ort costs may di¤er across tasks.
The agents maximize expected utility and are risk-neutral. Their utility is
additively separable in period-specic income and costs. At the end of each
17We have a similar result in the case of imperfect substitutes, but for very di¤erent
reasons (see Proposition 7).
18In the following, the use of i and/or j as an index always implies i; j 2 f1; 2g and
i 6= j.
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period t, the principal observes performance, which is an imperfect measure
sit = eit + "it of e¤ort. The error term "it is independently distributed across
agents and periods. In each period, the error distribution is the same for
agent 1 as for agent 2. However, the error distribution in period 1 may di¤er
from the one in period 2. This captures the notion that tasks in di¤erent
periods may also di¤er in terms of how easy it is to monitor e¤ort.19
Based on the rst-period performance, the principal awards the rst-
period prize W1 to agent i if si1 > sj1. Agent i receives the second-period
prize W2 = W  W1 if si2 + si1 > sj2 + sj1.20 The principals choice of the
rst-period weight  2 R thus determines the inuence of past performance
on the chance of winning in the second period.
Under a full-revelation policy ( = 1), the principal communicates the
measured performance of both players to the agents before they choose their
second-period e¤orts. In practice, the principal will typically not communi-
cate a concrete number. Instead, she may communicate whatever relevant
information she has to the agents, thereby creating a common understanding
about their relative performance.21 Under a no-revelation policy ( = 0), the
principal does not communicate the performance assessment. She does not
even communicate who won the rst-period prize and distributes both prizes
at the end of period 2.
The following notation is helpful to describe the solution of the game.
Denition 1 The error di¤erence of player i in period t (t = 1; 2) is
"it = "it "jt, his relative rst-period performance is si1 = si1 sj1 =
ei1 + "it, where eit = eit   ejt.
Clearly, eit =  ejt, "it =  "jt, si1 =  sj1.
19In a non-tournament setting, Ke et al. (2014) show that organizations optimally
hire workers into easy-to-monitor jobs with low e¤ort costs and then promote them into
di¢ cult-to-monitor jobs with high (marginal and absolute) e¤ort costs. In our setting,
this would correspond to 1 < 2 and K1 (e) < K2 (e), K 01 (e) < K
0
2 (e).
20In each period, in case of a tie, the principal assigns the prize to each agent with
probability one half.
21As we will see, second-period e¤orts depend negatively on the absolute value of the
performance di¤erence in the rst period. Hence, the principal has an incentive to always
report equal performances. This problem becomes negligible if the principal leaves the
communication to disinterested parties from within or outside the organization.
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We make the following assumption on the error distributions:
Assumption 2 "it is distributed as Ft (s) on R with a symmetric,
single-peaked, strictly positive and continuously di¤erentiable density ft (s).
This implies ft (s) = ft ( s), f 0t (s) =  f 0t ( s) and E ("it) = 0.22
For some results, we assume that the cost functions are quadratic:
(C1) The cost function is Kt (eit) = kt2 (eit)
2 with kt > 0.
We assume that, given a xed prize budget, the principals payo¤ is in-
creasing in e¤orts, where the e¤orts of di¤erent agents within periods are
perfect substitutes for the principal. We allow rst- and second period ef-
forts to be either perfect or imperfect substitutes. For perfect substitutes,
the principal chooses the incentive system so as to maximize expected total
e¤orts. For imperfect substitutes, she maximizes the expected product of rst
and second-period e¤orts. This corresponds to a complementarity between
rst- and second-period e¤orts, making it desirable to have similar e¤orts in
both periods.
4 Behavior of the agents
We rst analyze the equilibrium behavior of agents for given incentive system.
The following simple result is mentioned without proof.
Lemma 1 (i) The conditional probability that si1 > sj1 given ei1 and ej1 is
F1 (ei1   ej1).
(ii) The conditional probability that si2 + si1 > sj2 + sj1 given ei2,ej2 and
si1 is F2 (si1 + ei2   ej2).
4.1 Full revelation
In period 2, a players information set consists of all combinations of period
1 e¤orts and error di¤erences that are consistent with the own rst-period
22The assumptions on the distribution of the error di¤erences are guaranteed to hold if
the assumptions hold for the distributions of the observation errors.
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e¤ort ei1 and the observed relative performance si1.23 We use the Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) to deal with this imperfect information (Mas-
Colell et al. 1995, p. 285). The task is simplied because there are no
o¤-equilibrium events to consider, as f1 is strictly positive on R. Moreover,
period 1 enters player is payo¤s only via si1 and ei1, so that the unobserv-
able aspects of previous play (player js e¤ort choices) are irrelevant for the
playerschoices.
A pure strategy i of player i consists of a rst-period choice ei1 and a
function Ei2 mapping information sets (ei1;si1) to actions ei2. If player i
chose ei1, observes si1 and assumes that player j plays the pure strategy
j = (ej1; Ej2), he will assign probability one to the event that "i1 =
si1   ei1. We will always assume that beliefs are formed in this way,
without specifying them explicitly.
4.1.1 Second-period e¤orts
Using Lemma 1(ii), the expected second-period payo¤ of agent i, conditional
on the relative rst-period performance and second-period e¤orts, is
Ui2 (ei2; ej2;si1) = F2 (si1 + ei2)W2  K2 (ei2) . (1)
Thus, the rst period inuences the second-period payo¤ via the rst-period
relative performance si1. The corresponding rst-order condition is
f2(si1 + ei2)W2 = K
0
2 (ei2) . (2)
Though the game does not have any proper subgames because information
sets in period 2 are not singletons, payo¤s in period 2 are constant on infor-
mation sets. We use this in the following denition.
Denition 2 The second-period e¤ort game induced by si1 is the game
with players i = 1; 2, strategy spaces Xi = R+ and payo¤s given by (1) for
(ei2; ej2) 2 Xi Xj.
23This statement holds no matter whether the principal publicly announces the absolute
performance of each agent, or just the di¤erence.
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We obtain the following result:
Lemma 2 Suppose  = 1 (full revelation) and W2 > 0.
(i) In any equilibrium of the second-period e¤ort game, e¤orts are symmetric
and satisfy
ei2 (si1)  ei2 (si1; ;W2; 1) = (K 02) 1 [f2 (si1)W2] (3)
(ii) If e¤ort costs are su¢ ciently convex, (3) denes the unique Nash equi-
librium of the second-period e¤ort game.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 2 has some simple comparative statics implications.
Corollary 1 Suppose  = 1,  6= 0 and W2 > 0. Then ei2 is decreasing in
jsi1j and jj, and increasing in W2.
Proof. See Appendix.
The result on jsi1j implies that, if a laggard (an agent with si1 < 0)
increases own e¤ort, or a leader (an agent with si1 > 0) decreases e¤orts
marginally in period 1, both players increase e¤ort in period 2.24 The other
two results identify policy e¤ects. In particular, increasing the absolute value
of the rst-period weight  reduces second-period e¤orts.
In the PBE, the symmetric equilibrium of the second-period e¤ort game
is played after each realization of si1. Thus, the expected second-period
payo¤, conditional on rst-period performance, is
U si2 (si1)  Ui2
 
ei2 (si1) ;e

j2 ( si1) ;si1

: (4)
The expected second-period payo¤, given rst-period e¤orts, is
U ei2 (ei1; ej1)  E"i1U si2 (ei1 + "i1) : (5)
24This result reects the "well-known evaluation e¤ect or lack-of-competition e¤ect"
(Ederer 2010, p. 742).
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4.1.2 First-period e¤orts
Using Lemma 1(i), agent is optimization problem in period 1 is
max
ei10
F1 (ei1   ej1)W1 + U ei2 (ei1; ej1) K1 (ei1) .
The corresponding rst-order conditions is
f1 (ei1)W1 +
@U ei2
@ei1
= K 01 (ei1) . (6)
The following denition is crucial for the intuition.
Denition 3 The intensity of second-period competition is given by
C() = 2
Z 1
0
f2 (s) f1 (s) ds.
The logic of the denition is as follows. For each agent, f1 (s) captures
the density of the event that the relative rst-period performance of this
player is s when e¤orts are symmetric (as in equilibrium). Since both players
choose identical equilibrium e¤orts in the second period, f2 (s) = f2 ( s)
captures the density of the event that a strike of luck of one agent in period
2 exactly compensates a strike of luck of the other agent of size s in period 1.
Therefore, C() measures the joint probability of the event that the second-
period contest is a close run where a marginal e¤ort increase of one agent
will a¤ect the outcome of the second-period contest and tip the balance in
his favor: When C() is high, an agent who has been lucky in the rst period
cannot be too sure about his winning prospects in the second period, and
will therefore continue to put in some e¤ort.
C() is a function of the weight  with several simple properties. First,
C 0() = 2
Z 1
0
sf 02 (s) f1 (s) ds < 0 for  > 0: (7)
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An increase in the absolute value of the weight thus reduces the intensity of
second-period competition. Moreover:
C () > 0 (8)
C (0) = f2 (0) (9)
C 0(0) = 0 (10)
C() = C( ) (11)
We sometimes invoke a regularity condition that simplies the interpretation
of our results:
(C2) For  > 0, C() is increasing in .
This conditions holds, for instance, in Example E1 below. The following
condition rules out corner solutions in period 1:
f1 (0)W1 + W2C() > 0: (12)
(12) can only be binding for negative .25
The following result uses (6) to derive equilibrium e¤orts:
Proposition 1 Suppose  = 1 (full revelation).
(i) In any symmetric interior PBE, rst-period e¤orts must satisfy
e1 (;W1;W2; 1) = (K
0
1)
 1
[f1 (0)W1 + W2C()] . (13)
(ii) Suppose the cost functions are su¢ ciently convex. If (12) holds, (3) and
(13) describe the unique symmetric PBE strategies. If (12) is violated, e1 = 0
and (3) describe the unique symmetric PBE strategies.
Proof. See Appendix.
We defer the discussion of the second-order conditions to the appendix;
there we will show that they require su¢ ciently convex cost functions.26
25We will show below that the principal will never choose negative values for .
26The relevant condition is (32).
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By Proposition 1, if (C2) holds, then a higher positive weight of past e¤ort
always induces higher rst-period e¤ort. The term in brackets on the right-
hand side of (13) is the marginal benet from increasing ei1. The e¤ect on the
expected rst-period payo¤ is f1 (0)W1; the e¤ect on the expected second-
period payo¤ is W2C(), which is positive if  > 0. This term reects the
direct e¤ect of higher rst-period e¤ort on second-period winning chances.
The term does not capture strategic e¤ects on the future e¤orts of the other
player. Such e¤ects are relevant in the game, but they cancel out in the
symmetric equilibrium.27
We now characterize second-period e¤orts. Symmetry of the equilibrium
in Proposition 1 implies si1 = "i1. Using (3) and taking the expectation
over "i1, we obtain:
Corollary 2 The expected e¤orts in period 2 in the full-revelation PBE de-
scribed in Proposition 1 are
E (e2 (;W2; 1)) = 2
Z 1
0
(K 02)
 1
[f2 (s)W2] f1 (s) ds (14)
Proof. See Appendix.
Together with Assumption 2, Corollary 2 implies that second-period ef-
forts decrease in jj. Thus, rst-period e¤orts must increase at least locally
in jj near the optimal . Therefore, by (13), (C2) must hold locally near the
optimal . Otherwise, by Proposition 1 the principal could increase e¤orts in
both periods by reducing , contradicting optimality of .
27To see this, suppose  > 0; for  < 0, the argument is reversed. If, for any given
rst-period e¤ort choice, a player knew he was ahead of the other player, he would have
a strategic incentive to increase e¤orts to discourage player j from exerting e¤ort in the
future, whereas the converse would hold for a player who knows he is behind the opponent.
Since the game is stochastic, players have to consider the expected strategic e¤ects, which
can be positive or negative, but cancel out when rst-period e¤orts are identical.
15
4.2 No revelation
Under the no-revelation policy, agents simultaneously chose rst- and second-
period e¤orts according to
max
ei10;ei20
F1 (ei1   ej1)W1+ (15)
W2
Z 1
 1
F2 ( (ei1   ej1 + s) + ei2   ej2) f1 (s) ds K1 (ei1) K2 (ei2) .
The integral in (15) is the probability of winning the second-period prize,
conditional on e¤ort choices.28 This leads to a simple characterization of the
Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 2 (i) Suppose  = 0 (no revelation). In any symmetric interior
Nash equilibrium, e¤orts must satisfy:
e1 (;W1;W2; 0) = (K
0
1)
 1
[f1 (0)W1 + W2C()] > 0 (16)
e2 (;W2; 0) = (K
0
2)
 1
[W2C()] > 0. (17)
(ii) If the cost functions are su¢ ciently convex and (12) holds, (16) and (17)
describe the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of the game.29
Proof. See Appendix.
Both e¤ort levels reect standard cost-benet considerations. The mar-
ginal benet of rst-period e¤orts depends on the increased winning proba-
bility in period 2 (C()) as well as period 1 (f1 (0)).
By Propositions 1 and 2, rst-period e¤orts in any symmetric equilibrium
are non-stochastic and equal under both revelation policies; we thus write
e1 (;W1;W2) for rst-period equilibrium e¤orts.
30
28This follows from Lemma 1(ii).
29In Appendix 8.1.6 we identify the meaning of su¢ cient convexity. We also show
that the second-order conditions hold locally for arbitrary convex cost function.
30The result reects the fact that the marginal e¤ect of rst-period e¤ort on expected
second period payo¤s is identical under both policies. Intuitively, a marginal increase of ei1
has positive e¤ects on the second-period payo¤s of player i if it su¢ ces to tip the balance in
the contest in period 2 in his favor. The probability that this happens, which is captured
by C() for both players, is independent of whether information on si1 is revealed to
players before they choose second-period e¤orts. In this argument, it is important to start
from the respective equilibrium, with equal e¤orts in both periods.
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5 Optimal policy
We now characterize the optimal policy of the principal.31 To this end, we x
the total budget as W , so that W2 = W  W1. Since we focus on symmetric
equilibria and e¤orts within periods are perfect substitutes, we can write the
principals objective in terms of the e¤orts of only one agent. As rst-period
e¤orts are non-stochastic, the principals objective functions for perfect and
imperfect substitutes, respectively, are:
V P (;W1; )  e1 (;W1;W  W1) + E (e2 (;W  W1; )) ; (18)
V I (;W1; )  e1 (;W1;W  W1)  E (e2 (;W  W1; )) . (19)
5.1 Optimal revelation policy
According to (18) and (19), the principal chooses the revelation policy that
induces higher expected second-period e¤orts, no matter whether e¤orts are
perfect or imperfect substitutes. Using Jensens inequality, we can compare
the expected second-period e¤orts in the equilibria characterized by Propo-
sitions 1 and 2:32
Proposition 3 8 2 R;W1 < W :
(i) If K 0002  0, then e2 (;W  W1; 0)  E (e2 (;W  W1; 1)).
(ii) If K 0002  0, then e2 (;W  W1; 0)  E (e2 (;W  W1; 1)).
Proof. See Appendix.
For quadratic costs, (i) and (ii) together imply that expected second-
period e¤orts are equal under both revelation policies.33 Proposition 3 ap-
31In the following discussion, we assume that, for given error distributions and e¤ort
cost functions, second-order conditions hold for all allowable choices of the policy variables.
This is for instance true for the normal-quadratic example of Section 6.
32Intuitively, with revelation, the agents base their second-period decisions on the re-
vealed asymmetry between players, whereas, without revelation, the expected asymmetry
is decisive. Compare second-period decisions with and without revelation for given e¤ort
choices in the rst period: For error realizations where the asymmetry is low (high) relative
to expectations, e¤orts will be higher (lower) with revelation than without.
33Intuitively, the role of K 0002 is an immediate consequence of the fact that second-period
e¤orts are the inverse of marginal costs for  = 0 and the expectation of the inverse of
marginal costs for  = 1. Thus, concavity (convexity) of the inverse marginal costs is
decisive for which regime yields higher e¤orts on expectation.
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plies to all values of  and W1 and, in particular, to those that maximize
e2 (;W  W1; 0) or E (e2 (;W  W1; 1)). Thus, even if the principal has
chosen the optimal parameters for a given revelation policy, switching to the
other revelation policy is benecial if the corresponding condition on K 0002
holds. Hence, we have proven:
Corollary 3 The optimal revelation policy is the same for perfect and im-
perfect substitutes, with  = 0 if K 0002 > 0 and  = 1 if K
000
2 < 0. For K
000
2 = 0,
expected payo¤s are independent of the revelation policy.
The result extends Aoyagi (2010) who shows that, for one prize (W1 = 0)
and equal weights ( = 1), the e¤ort cost function completely determines the
optimal revelation policy.34 Our result shows that this statement holds for
arbitrary W1 and .
5.2 Optimal weight of past performance
The principal can give incentives for rst-period e¤orts with W1 or . The
next result shows that, no matter how high the rst-period prize is, the
principal should always assign a positive weight to past performance in the
second-period contest. For perfect substitutes, we denote the optimal choice
of  conditional on W1 and  as P (W1; ) and the optimal choice of W1
conditional on  as W P1 (; ). For imperfect substitutes, we write 
I(W1; )
and W I1 (; ).
Proposition 4 P (W1; ) > 0 and I(W1; ) > 0 8 W1 < W and  = 0; 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
This result holds because, for  = 0, the marginal e¤ect of  on rst-period
e¤ort is positive and bounded away from zero (a rst-order e¤ect), whereas
it is zero for second-period e¤ort (a second-order e¤ect). To understand the
latter point, note that the adverse e¤ect of increasing  > 0 on second-period
e¤orts arises because the second-period contest becomes more asymmetric,
that is, less competitive (C 0 () < 0). As C 0 (0) = 0, this adverse e¤ect
vanishes as  approaches 0.
34Ederer (2010) also treats this case in his discussion of non-complementary abilities.
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Proposition 4 states that performance evaluation should always have
some memory: Firms should consider not only the recent performance of
employees and suppliers, but also the performance in the distant past. Sim-
ilarly, students should not only be judged with respect to their recent per-
formance. The open question is: How large should the shadow of the past
be? To answer this question for perfect substitutes, the next result char-
acterizes the weight of past performance for quadratic costs (C1). In this
case, revelation and no revelation imply the same behavior. Thus, we write
P (W1)  P (W1; 0) = P (W1; 1), and similarly forW P1 (). Furthermore, we
write
 
P ;W P1

= arg max;W1 V
P (;W1).
Proposition 5 Suppose (C1) holds. Then, 8 W1 < W , P (W1) satisesC 0()C()
 = 1k1
k2
+ 
(20)
Proof. See Appendix.
(20) captures the trade-o¤ between strengthening rst-period incentives
and weakening second-period competition. Changes in the error distributions
that increase the sensitivity
C0()C()  of second-period competition to the rst-
period weight  for all  reduce the optimal .35 Furthermore, the higher
rst-period marginal e¤ort costs are compared to second-period marginal
e¤ort costs, the lower is the optimal . Note that (20) and thus the optimal
 is independent of the rst-period prize W1.36
5.3 Optimal rst-period prize
We now supply several results on the optimal prize structure. We also use
these results to obtain further insights on the optimal weights.
35We illustrate this in Figure 2 below.
36This is due to the fact that W1 enters
@V P (;W1)
@ linearly. The relevant expression is
(43). Since @
2V P (;W1)
@@W1
< 0, the increase in payo¤by setting  optimally depends positively
on W  W1, the prize paid in the second period.
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5.3.1 Perfect substitutes
For perfect substitutes, we conne ourselves to quadratic costs (C1) in the
main text. The results are special cases of more general, but less transparent
results that we state and prove in Appendix 8.4 (Propositions 9 and 10).
For quadratic costs, it is optimal to give only one positive prize. Depend-
ing on the observation error distributions, the prize should be based only on
rst-period performance (W P1 = W ) or on second-period performance as well
(W P1 = 0).
Corollary 4 Suppose (C1) holds.
(i) If f1 (0) <

k1
k2
+ 

C(), then the optimal rst-period prize conditional
on  is W P1 () = 0. If 9  2 R s.t. f1 (0) <

k1
k2
+ 

C(), then the uncon-
ditonally optimal rst-period prize is W P1 = 0.
(ii) If f1 (0) >

k1
k2
+ 

C(), then the optimal rst-period prize conditional
on  is W P1 () = W . If f1 (0) >

k1
k2
+ 

C() 8  2 R, then the uncondi-
tonally optimal rst-period prize is W P1 = W .
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition is straightforward. By (i), when second-period competi-
tion (as captured by C()) is intense enough relative to the precision of the
rst-period measurement (as captured by f1 (0)), then second-period e¤orts
should be positive, which requires a second-period prize.37 Otherwise (case
(ii)), there should be no second-period prize. However, we will show in Sec-
tion 6 that W P1 = 0 always holds in a normal-quadratic example. Note that
the condition under which there is no rst-period prize is easier to satisfy
when rst-period marginal e¤ort costs are high compared to second-period
marginal e¤ort costs.
Beyond quadratic e¤ort costs In Appendix 8.4, we provide results on
the optimal rst-period prizes and weights for general cost functions. These
results imply Proposition 4 for K 000t = 0 as a special case. When K
000
t 6= 0, the
e¤ort choices with and without information revelation are no longer identical,
37Note that f1 (0) is a purely local measure of precision, capturing the probability that
identical e¤orts translate into identical performance measures.
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so that the optimal policies do not coincide. Proposition 9 in the Appen-
dix characterizes the optimal prize structure with information revelation for
K 000t  0, in which case information revelation is superior to no revelation by
Proposition 3. Conversely, Proposition 10 in the Appendix characterizes the
optimal prize structure without information revelation for K 000t  0, where
no information revelation is superior to revelation by Proposition 3. The
interpretation of the general propositions is similar as for quadratic costs: If
the rst-period contest is too noisy, it is optimal not to give a rst-period
prize.
5.3.2 Imperfect Substitutes
For imperfect substitutes, we also obtain a general condition under which the
optimal rst-period prize for a given past weight is zero with performance
revelation. The result applies if K 000t  0, so that revelation is optimal by
Corollary 3.
Proposition 6 Suppose K 000t  0 for t = 1; 2. For all  > 0, W I1 (; 1) = 0 if
f1 (0) < C ().
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus, as with perfect substitutes, this (su¢ cient) condition is easier to
satisfy if the rst-period signal is not very precise (f1 (0) is low) and second-
period competition C () is intense. To obtain stronger results, we now
specialize to quadratic e¤ort costs. As behavior is the same with and without
revelation, we write I(W1)  I(W1; 0) = I(W1; 1) and similarly forW I1 ().
Furthermore, we write
 
I ;W I1

= arg max;W1 V
I (;W1). We obtain:
Proposition 7 If (C1) holds, the optimal rst-period prize conditional on
 is W I1 ()  W2 8 , so that the optimal unconditional rst-period prize is
W I1  W2 .
Proof. See Appendix.
There is no counterpart of this result for perfect substitutes, where it
can, in principle, be optimal to refrain from inducing second-period e¤ort
altogether. For imperfect substitutes, principals aim at a balanced e¤ort
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distribution. Therefore, they need to make sure not to give excessive rst-
period prizes, because they are already providing indirect incentives for rst-
period e¤ort through the weight .
The following result species the optimal solution further:
Proposition 8 Suppose (C1) holds.
(i) W I1 () > 0 if and only if f1 (0) > 2C (). In this case
W I1 () = W
f1 (0)  2C ()
2f1 (0)  2C () > 0.
(ii) The optimal
 
W I1 ; 
I

satises one of the following necessary properties:
(a) W I1 = 0 and
C 0(I)C(I)
 = 12I ;
(b) W I1 = W
f1 (0)  2IC
 
I

2f1 (0)  2IC (I) > 0 and
C 0(I)C(I)
 = C
 
I

f1 (0)
.
Proof. See Appendix.
Result (i) describes the optimal prize structure conditional on . As with
perfect substitutes, the optimal rst-period prize is positive if rst-period
precision (captured by f1 (0)) is high and second-period competition C () is
low. Moreover, the result sharpens Proposition 6 by showing that, at least
for quadratic costs, f1 (0) < C () is not necessary to guarantee that the
conditionally optimal prize structure satises W I1 () = 0. Finally, the result
shows that, when (C1) and (C2) hold, rst-period prizes and weights are
substitutes: The optimal rst-period prize is lower the higher the rst-period
weight  is.
Result (ii) describes the unconditionally optimal solution
 
W I1 ; 
I
1

for
quadratic costs. There are two possibilities, both depicted in Figure 1. Ac-
cording to (a), the rst-period prize may be zero, in which case the optimal
rst-period weight is described by a simple condition that depends exclu-
sively on C () (see point A on the horizontal axis in Figure 1). As with
perfect substitutes, the weight is lower if the adverse e¤ect of  on future
competition is higher. By (b), the rst-period prize may be positive, in
which case the optimal rst-period weight is determined by a condition that
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Figure 1: Necessary conditions for imperfect substitutes
depends on error distributions not only via C (), but also via f1 (0) directly,
as captured by W I1 () (see point B on the diagonal line in Figure 1).
38 The
error distributions determine which of the two cases in Proposition 8 applies.
For instance, with normal error distributions, the rst-period prize is zero
(see Corollary 6 below).
Note that in contrast to the perfect substitutes case (Propositions 5 and
4), the optimal weights and prizes are independent of the relation between
rst- and second-period e¤ort costs and entirely determined by the properties
of the observation error distributions.
5.4 Restrictions on allowable policies
In some circumstances, principals may not be free to choose arbitrary incen-
tive systems. For instance, there may be a limit on the extent to which they
may consider past performance in current evaluations. Then rst-period
prizes may act as substitutes for performance weights: For instance, with
perfect substitutes, Proposition 4 shows that it is weakly easier to satisfy
the condition for W P1 () = W and correspondingly weakly more di¢ cult to
satisfy the condition for W P1 () = 0 when  is bounded above. Conversely,
38Note that W I1 () is typically not linear.
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the prize structure may be restricted. For instance, a principal may have
to spread the prize sum evenly. According to Proposition 7, W1  W2 must
hold for the optimal rst-period prize with imperfect substitutes. In cases
where an unconstrained principal would set W1 < W2 , a principal who has to
set W1 = W2 is giving excessive rst-period incentives relative to the uncon-
strained case. To make up for this, she has to adjust the weight of rst-period
performance downwards.
6 A Normal-Quadratic Example
To obtain sharper results, we introduce a simple example.
Example E1: The cost function is Kt (eit) = k2e
2
it for t = 1; 2. The error
di¤erence "it is normally distributed with variance 2t .
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Example E1 satises Assumptions 1 and 2.40
Corollary 5 In E1, a PBE exists. The equilibrium e¤orts under revelation
and no revelation are
e1 (;W1;W2) =
1
k
p
2
 
W1
1
+
W2p
22 + 
2
1
2
!
. (21)
e2 (;W2; 0) = E (e

2 (;W2; 1)) =
W2
k
p
2
p
22 + 
2
1
2
. (22)
Proof. See Appendix.
Comparative statics for second-period e¤orts are straightforward. Lower
marginal e¤ort costs, higher second-period prize, lower rst-period weight
and higher rst- and second-period precision induce higher second-period
e¤orts. Analogous results hold for period one. First-period e¤orts also in-
crease if the second-period precision increases, given  > 0: The parameter
change makes rst-period e¤ort more worthwhile, because the positive e¤ect
on winning the second-period prize increases. Finally, a redistribution of the
prize sum from period 2 to period 1 increases rst-period e¤orts, because the
39A normally distributed error di¤erence follows, for example, from normally distributed
observation errors.
40In the appendix, we also derive the second-order conditons ((66) and (68)).
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positive e¤ect of an increase in the rst-period prize is always stronger than
the negative e¤ect of an identical decrease in the second-period prize.
Figure 2: Necessary conditions for  with perfect substitutes
Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 5 for Example E1. It shows how the
optimal weight P depends on the sensitivity
C0()C()  of second-period com-
petition to , which is low if the second-period performance measurement is
relatively imprecise compared to the rst-period measurement, implying a
higher optimal weight of rst-period performance.
Corollary 6 characterizes the optimal policy. The results endogenize the
assumption that W1 = 0 and  = 1 in Aoyagi (2010) for identically normally
distributed error distributions (1 = 2).41
Corollary 6 In E1,
(i) P (W1) =
22
21
8 W1 < W . Furthermore, W P1 = 0 and P = 
2
2
21
.
(ii) Necessary conditions for the optimum are I = 2
1
and W I1 = 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
(i) shows that it is optimal to give only a second-period prize with per-
fect substitutes. Incentives for rst-period e¤orts come exclusively from the
weight of past performance, which is the ratio of the error variances in the
41Similarly, we provide a justication for Ederers (2010) model with non-complementary
abilities in which W1 = 0 and  = 0.
25
two periods. (ii) yields a similar result for imperfect substitutes, with vari-
ances replaced by standard deviations. Note that I > P if and only if
2
1
< 1: Greater precision of the second-period performance measure leads
to higher second-period e¤orts compared to the rst-period e¤orts. With
imperfect substitutes, where an even e¤ort ow is desired, a greater weight
of the rst period is used to mitigate the asymmetry.
The example demonstrates the importance of the right incentive system.
To see this, suppose that initially the principal chooses (;W1) =
 
0; W
2

, so
that there are two independent and identical tournaments. Next suppose that
the principal introduces the optimal policy in two steps: First, she maintains
the equal division of the prize sum across periods, but chooses the optimal
weight P
 
W
2

, so that (;W1) = (
22
21
; W
2
). Finally, she chooses prizes and
weights optimally, so that (;W1) = (
22
21
; 0). Simple calculations (available on
request) show that if the principal sets only  optimally, the relative increase
of her payo¤, compared to the initial situation, is
EP 
V P

22
21
; W
2

  V P  0; W
2

V P
 
0; W
2
 = p21 + 22   1
(1 + 2)
By optimally adjusting the prize structure as well, she achieves an additional
relative payo¤ increase of
EPW1
V P

22
21
; 0

  V P

22
21
; W
2

V P

22
21
; W
2
 =p21 + 22   2p
21 + 
2
2 + 2
.
The relative importance of these two e¤ects depends on the precision of the
performance measures. If second-period performance measurement is very
precise (2  0), whereas the rst-period measure is not, then EP  0;
If rst-period performance measurement is very precise (1  0), whereas
the second-period measure is not, then EPW1  0. Thus, getting the perfor-
mance weight right (rather than choosing  = 0) is only important when
second-period performance measurement is imprecise; getting the second-
period prize right (rather than splitting the price equally) only matters when
rst-period performance measurement is imprecise.
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Figure 3: Relative payo¤ increase when setting W1 and  optimally
Compared to the initial situation, the total relative payo¤ increase from
setting both W1 and  optimally is
EP;W1
V P

22
21
; 0

  V P  0; W
2

V P
 
0; W
2
 =2p21 + 22   (1 + 2)
(1 + 2)
Figure 3 shows how the total relative payo¤ increase from choosing the op-
timal incentive system depends on the variances of the error distributions.
EP;W1 attains its minimum for 1 = 2 at
p
2   1  41%. Thus, the
percentage payo¤ increase from implementing the optimal policy is lowest
if both performance measurements are equally precise. Even in this case,
however, the benets are substantial: The principal can achieve 41% higher
payo¤ with a budget-neutral policy adjustment. Figure 3 further shows that
if one of the performance measures is very precise (t  0), then EP;W1  1.
Hence, the more precise one of the performance measures, the more the
principal can benet from implementing the optimal policy.
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7 Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes intertemporal e¤ort provision in two-stage tournaments.
A principal with a xed budget for prizes faces two risk-neutral agents. She
observes noisy signals of e¤ort in both periods. She aims at maximizing
either total e¤orts (perfect substitutes) or the product of rst- and second-
period e¤orts (imperfect substitutes). She decides (i) how to spread prize
money across the two periods, (ii) how to weigh performance in the two
periods when awarding the second period prize, and (iii) whether to reveal
performance after the rst period.
We obtain several new insights. First, design matters. The potential
losses from suboptimal incentive systems are substantial.42 Second, several
interesting results of existing research on revelation policy and performance
weights are much more general than previously known, extending in partic-
ular to the important case that e¤orts in di¤erent periods are not perfect
substitutes. Third, we provide new results on the determinants of optimal
incentives. We show that the weight of past performance should depend
negatively on the extent to which a higher weight of the past reduces compe-
tition. We also show how the spread of prizes across periods and the choice
of weights depends on the relative precision of performance measures in the
two periods. Finally, we show that, under quite general conditions, there
should be no rst-period prize.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Behavior of the Agents43
8.1.1 Proof of Lemma 2
(i) Equilibrium e¤orts must be positive because f2 > 0 by Assumption 2 and
K 02 (0) = 0 by Assumption 1. Since f2 is symmetric by Assumption 2 and
  (s11+e12) = s21+e22;
the left-hand side of the rst-order condition (2) is equal for both agents. Hence
ei2 (si1) = e

j2( si1), so that the second-period e¤orts are the same for both
agents. Thus, (2) becomes f2 (si1)W2= K
0
2 (ei2). As K
00
2> 0 by Assumption 1,
K 02 therefore is strictly increasing and thus invertible. Thus (3) must hold in any
equilibrium.
(ii) The following inequality guarantees that the second-period payo¤s (1) of
player i are strictly concave in ei2:
f 02 (si1+ei2)W2 < K
00
2 (ei2) 8 si12 R, ei2; ej22 R+. (23)
(23) requires K2 to be su¢ ciently convex.44 If this condition holds globally, the
rst-order conditions (2) characterize a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the equilib-
rium is unique, as (3) must necessarily hold in any equilibrium by Part (i) of the
lemma.
8.1.2 Proof of Corollary 1
The inverse function theorem yieldsh
(K 02)
 1
i0
(f2 (si1)W2) =
1
K 002
 
(K 02)
 1 (f2 (si1)W2)
 .
43The proofs in this section generalize Aoyagi (2010) and Ederer (2010) (for non-
complementary abilities) who assume W1 = 0 and  = 1.
44By Assumption 2, f 02 (si1+ei2) < 0 if si1+ei2 > 0, so that (23) always holds
in this case. For the case that si1 + ei2 < 0, suppose f 02 is bounded above. Then (23)
holds globally if K 002 has a su¢ ciently high lower bound.
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Thus (3) implies
@ei2
@si1
=
f 02 (si1)W2
K 002
 
(K 02)
 1 (f2 (si1)W2)
 ; (24)
@ei2
@
=
si1f
0
2 (si1)W2
K 002
 
(K 02)
 1 (f2 (si1)W2)
 ; (25)
@ei2
@W 2
=
f2 (si1)
K 002
 
(K 02)
 1 (f2 (si1)W2)
 . (26)
By Assumption 1, K 002> 0. By Assumption 2, if si1< (>)0 ^  6= 0 ^W 2> 0,
then f 02 (si1)> (<)0 and thus
@ei2
@si1
> (<)0 . This implies that ei2 is de-
creasing in jsi1j. As si1= ei1+i1 we obtain the results for ei1 and ej1.
Similar arguments show that @ei2
@
> (<)0 for  < (>)0 and thus ei2 decreasing in
jj. Since f2> 0 by Assumption 2, we have @ei2@W 2> 0.
8.1.3 Proof of Proposition 1
(i) We rst derive expressions for @U
e
i2
@ei1
for symmetric rst-period e¤orts. This
allows us to state the FOC.
Lemma 3
@U ei2
@ei1

ei1=ej1
= W 2C() (27)
Proof. Applying the envelope theorem to (4), we obtain
dU si2 (si1)
dsi1
=
@U i2
@ej2
@ej2 ( si1)
@si1
+
@U i2
@si1
: (28)
Using (24) and the symmetry of the density (Assumption 2),
@ej2 ( si1)
@si1
=
@ei2 (si1)
@si1
=
f 02 (si1)W2
K 002
 
(K 02)
 1 (f2 (si1)W2)
 .
(1) implies
@Ui2
@ej2
=  f 2 (si1+ei2)W2;
@Ui2
@si1
= f 2 (si1+ei2)W2:
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Using these equations in (28) and inserting ei2= 0, we obtain
dU si2
dsi1
=   f 2 (si1) f
0
2 (si1)W
2
2
K 002
 
(K 02)
 1 (f2 (si1)W2)
+f 2 (si1)W2:
Using this in (5), we obtain
@U ei2
@ei1
=Z 1
 1
"
 f 2 ( (ei1+s)) f
0
2 ( (ei1+s))W
2
2
K 002
 
(K 02)
 1 (f2 ( (ei1+s))W2)
 +f 2 ( (ei1+s))W2
#
f1 (s) ds
= W 2
Z 1
 1
f2 ( (ei1+s)) f1 (s) ds 
W 22
Z 1
 1
f2 ( (ei1+s)) f
0
2 ( (ei1+s))
K 002
 
(K 02)
 1 (f2 ( (ei1+s))W2)
f1 (s) ds:
Let
A : =
Z 1
 1
f2 ( (ei1+s)) f1 (s) ds;
B : =
Z 1
 1
f2 ( (ei1+s)) f
0
2 ( (ei1+s))
K 002
 
(K 02)
 1 (f2 ( (ei1+s))W2)
f1 (s) ds.
With this notation,
@U ei2
@ei1
= W 2A  W 22B. (29)
Substituting s = t ei1 and ds = dt in A and decomposing the integral gives
A =
Z 0
 1
f2 (t) f1 (t ei1) dt+
Z 1
0
f2 (t) f1 (t ei1) dt.
Let u =  t. Symmetry of f1 and f2 by Assumption 2 implies f2 (t)= f2 (u)
and f1 (t ei1)= f1 (u+ ei1). Hence,Z 0
 1
f2 (t) f1 (t ei1) dt =
Z 1
0
f2 (u) f1 (u+ ei1) du.
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Thus,
A =
Z 1
0
f2 (u) f1 (u+ei1) du+
Z 1
0
f2 (t) f1 (t ei1) dt
=
Z 1
0
f2 (t) [f1 (t+ei1) +f 1 (t ei1)] dt.
Substituting s = t ei1 and ds = dt in B and decomposing the integral, we
obtain
B =
Z 0
 1
f2 (t) f
0
2 (t) f1 (t ei1)
K 002
 
(K 02)
 1 (f2 (t)W2)
dt+Z 1
0
f2 (t) f
0
2 (t) f1 (t ei1)
K 002
 
(K 02)
 1 (f2 (t)W2)
dt.
Again using u =  t and appealing to symmetry, f2 (t)=f2 (u), f 02 (t)= f 02 (u)
and f1 (t ei1)= f1 (u+ ei1). ThusZ 0
 1
f2 (t) f
0
2 (t) f1 (t ei1)
K 002
 
(K 02)
 1 (f2 (t)W2)
dt =Z 1
0
f2 (u) ( f 02 (u)) f1 (u+ei1)
K 002
 
(K 02)
 1 (f2 (u)W2)
 du.
Hence,
B =
Z 1
0
 f 2 (u) f 02 (u) f1 (u+ei1)
K 002
 
(K 02)
 1 (f2 (u)W2)
 du+Z 1
0
f2 (t) f
0
2 (t) f1 (t ei1)
K 002
 
(K 02)
 1 (f2 (t)W2)
dt
=
Z 1
0
f2 (t) f
0
2 (t) [ f 1 (t+ei1) +f 1 (t ei1)]
K 002
 
(K 02)
 1 (f2 (t)W2)
 dt.
Substituting the expressions for A and B into (29) and using s = t, we obtain
@U ei2
@ei1
= W 2
Z 1
0
f2 (s) [f1 (s+ ei1) +f 1 (s ei1)] ds (30)
+W 22
Z 1
0
f2 (s) f
0
2 (s) [f1 (s+ ei1) f 1 (s ei1)]
K 002
 
(K 02)
 1 (f2 (s)W2)
 ds.
With ei1= 0, we obtain (27).
Together, (6) and Lemma 3 imply
f1 (0)W1+W 2C() = K
0
1 (ei1) .
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By Assumption 1, K 01 is invertible. We thus obtain (13) as a necessary condition
for any symmetric interior PBE.
(ii) We know from Lemma 2(ii) that (2) implies sequential rationality in the
second period. Moreover, from the discussion at the beginning of Section 4.1,
beliefs are consistent.
As K 01(0) = 0 by Assumption 1, e¤orts must be positive in any symmetric
equilibrium if (12) holds. Thus, by Part (i), (13) is a necessary condition for an
equilibrium. The second-order condition for player i is
f 01 (ei1)W1+
@2U ei2
@e2i1
< K 001 (ei1) 8ei1; ej12 R+. (31)
Inserting (30) in (31) gives
f 01 (ei1)W1+W 2
Z 1
0
f2 (s) [f
0
1 (s+ ei1) f 01 (s ei1)] ds+ (32)
W 22
Z 1
0
f2 (s) f
0
2 (s) [f
0
1 (s+ ei1) +f
0
1 (s ei1)]
K 002
 
(K 02)
 1 (f2 (s)W2)
 ds < K 001 (ei1) .
The left-hand side of this inequality is decreasing in K 002 , while the right-hand side
is increasing in K 001 . For given policy parameters and distributions, (31) there-
fore holds as long as min

K 001 (0); K
00
2(0)
	
, which is a lower bound for K 001 (ei1)
and K 002
 
(K 02)
 1 (f2 (s)W2)

, is su¢ cently large. In this case, the second-order
condition can be guaranteed to hold whenever the slopes of f1 and f2 are bounded.
If these conditions hold globally, (13) thus describes an equilibrium, which is
the unique symmetric equilibrium.
8.1.4 Proof of Corollary 2
Symmetry of the equilibrium implies si1= "i1. Hence, (3) implies
ei2 (si1; ;W 2; 1) = (K
0
2)
 1
(f2 ("i1)W2) .
Taking the expectation over "i1, we obtain
E"i1 (e

i2 (si1; ;W 2; 1)) =
Z 1
 1
(K 02)
 1
(f2 (s)W2) f1 (s) ds.
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From the symmetry of the density by Assumption 2, we get (14).
8.1.5 Proof of Proposition 2
(i) From (15), the rst-order conditions are
f1 (ei1)W1+W 2
Z 1
 1
f2 ( (ei1+s) +ei2) f1 (s) ds = K
0
1 (ei1)
W2
Z 1
 1
f2 ( (ei1+s) +ei2) f1 (s) ds = K
0
2 (ei2)
For the symmetric case ei1= ei2= 0, this simplies to
f1 (0)W1+W 2C() = K
0
1 (ei1) ;
W2C() = K
0
2 (ei2) .
Inverting K 01 and K 02 yields (16) and (17).
(ii) If (12) holds, rst-period equilibrium e¤orts are positive because K 01(0) = 0
by Assumption 1. Equilibrium e¤orts in the second period are positive because
W2C() > 0 by Assumption 2. By part (i), (16) and (17) are necessary equilibrium
conditions.
Consider the following second-order conditions45
f 01 (ei1)W1+
2W2
Z 1
 1
f 02 ( (ei1+s) +ei2) f1 (s) ds < K
00
1 (ei1) ; (33)
K 001 (ei1)W2
Z 1
 1
f 02 ( (ei1+s) +ei2) f1 (s) ds
+K 002 (ei2) 

f 01 (ei1)W1+
2W2
Z 1
 1
f 02 ( (ei1+s) +ei2) f1 (s) ds

(34)
 f 01 (ei1)W1W2
Z 1
 1
f 02 ( (ei1+s) +ei2) f1 (s) ds < K
00
1 (ei1)K
00
2 (ei2) .
If these conditions hold globally, the expected payo¤ of player i is a strictly con-
cave function of (ei1; ei2), so that (16) and (17) describe best responses, and thus
characterize a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, this is the unique symmetric equi-
45(33) is the condition that expected payo¤s are strictly concave in (ei1); (34) is the
condition that the Hessian of the expected payo¤function has strictly positive determinant.
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librium.
8.1.6 Discussing Second-Order Conditions (No revelation)
Global Second-Order Conditions We rst show that (33) and (34) hold
for given policy parameters and distributions as long as Kt is su¢ ciently convex
for t = 1; 2. For (33), this is obvious, as the right-hand side is increasing in K100 ().
To see that the statement is also true for (34), let
A  W2
Z 1
 1
f 02 ( (ei1+s) +ei2) f1 (s) ds
B  f 01 (ei1)W1+2W2
Z 1
 1
f 02 ( (ei1+s) +ei2) f1 (s) ds
C   f 01 (ei1)W1W2
Z 1
 1
f 02 ( (ei1+s) +ei2) f1 (s) ds
With this notation, (34) can be written as
K 001 (ei1) A+K 002 (ei2) B + C  K 001 (ei1)K 002 (ei2) (35)
To prove that (34) holds for su¢ ciently convex cost functions, suppose it does not
hold for some pair of cost function eK1 and eK2. Let cKt (e) = eKt (e) +2e2. Then
(35) for bK1 and bK2 is
eK 001 (ei1) A+ eK 002 (ei2) B + C  (36)eK 001 (ei1) eK 002 (ei2) + eK 001 (ei1) + eK 002 (ei2)  A B+2
For all A and B, the right-hand side of this inequality can be made arbitrarily
high by increasing , so that the inequality is satised and thus (34) holds.
Local Second-Order Conditions In the symmetric equilibrium, ei1=
ei2= 0: Using this equation in (33) and (34), f 01 (0)= 0 and the symmetry of f1
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and f2 (Assumption 2) gives
2W2
Z 1
 1
f 02 (s) f1 (s) ds < K
00
1 (ei1) ; (37)
W2
K 002 (ei2)
+
2W2
K 001 (ei1)
Z 1
 1
f 02 (s) f1 (s) ds  1. (38)
By Assumption 2, f1 (s) = f 1 ( s) and f 02 (s) =  f 02 ( s). This implies
that
R1
 1 f
0
2 (s) f1 (s) ds = 0. Thus, the left-hand sides of (37) and (38) are all
0 and the inequalities hold automatically.
8.2 Revelation Policy: Proof of Proposition 346
(14) and (17) imply
e2 (;W  W 1; 0) E (e2 (;W  W 1; 1)) =
(K 02)
 1
((W  W 1)C ()) 2
Z 1
0
(K 02)
 1
(f2 (s) (W  W 1)) f1 (s) ds.
Using Denition 3 and the symmetry of f1 and f2, the right-hand side can be
written as
(K 02)
 1

(W  W 1)
Z 1
 1
f2 (s) f1 (s) ds

 
Z 1
1
(K 02)
 1
(f2 (s) (W  W 1)) f1 (s) ds.
Substituting g (s) (W  W 1)f2 (s), this becomes
(K 02)
 1
Z 1
 1
g (s) f1 (s) ds

 
Z 1
 1
(K 02)
 1
(g (s)) f1 (s) ds.
According to Jensens inequality, this expression is weakly negative (weakly posi-
tive) if (K 02)
 1 is convex (concave), which is the case if and only if K 02 is concave
(convex), that is, K 0002  0 (K 0002  0).
46The proof resembles Aoyagi (2010) and Ederer (2010) (case with non-complementary
abilities), but allows for W1 > 0 and  6= 1.
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8.3 Optimal Weights
8.3.1 Proof of Proposition 4
We start with several auxiliary results. Then, we show that  < 0 is never optimal.
Finally, we show that it is always optimal to increase  from zero to some positive
value.
Lemma 4 Suppose 1> 0 and 2=  1. Then,
(i)
e1 (1;W  W 1; 1) > e1 (2;W1;W  W1).
(ii)
E (e2 (1;W  W 1; 1)) = E (e2 (2;W  W 1; 1)) .
(iii)
e2 (1;W  W 1; 0) = e2 (2;W  W 1; 0) .
Proof. (i) From (13) and (16) and using (11), we have
e1 (1;W1;W  W 1) e1 (2;W1;W  W1) = (39)
(K 01)
 1
(f1 (0)W1+1 (W  W 1)C(1)) 
(K 01)
 1
(f1 (0)W1 1 (W  W 1)C(1)) .
As K 001 > 0, (K
0
1)
 1 is strictly increasing. Thus, (39) is strictly positive.
(ii) (14) and f2 (2s) = f2 (1s) imply the result.
(iii) (17) and (11) imply the result.
Lemma 5 Suppose W1< W . Then,
(i)
@e1 (;W 1;W  W 1)
@

=0
> 0.
(ii)
@E (e2 (;W  W 1; 1))
@

=0
=
@e2 (;W  W1; 0)
@

=0
= 0.
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Proof. (i) From (13) and (16),
@e1 (;W1;W  W1)
@
=
(W  W 1) (C () +C 0())
K 001

(K 01)
 1 (f1 (0)W1+ (W  W 1)C ())
 . (40)
Hence,
@e1 (;W 1;W  W 1)
@

=0
=
(W  W 1)C (0)
K 001

(K 01)
 1 (f1 (0)W1)

=
(W  W 1) f2 (0)
K 001

(K 01)
 1 f1 (0)W1
 .
where the second equality follows from (9). As K 001 > 0 and f2 (0)> 0,
@e1(;W1;W W1)
@

=0
> 0 provided W1< W .
(ii) From (14),
@E (e2 (1;W  W 1; 1))
@
= 2
Z 1
0
sf 02 (s) (W  W 1) f1 (s)
K 002

(K 02)
 1 (f2 (s) (W  W 1))
ds. (41)
Hence,
@E (e2 (1;W  W 1; 1))
@

=0
= 2
Z 1
0
sf 02 (0) (W  W 1) f1 (s)
K 002

(K 02)
 1 (f2 (0) (W  W 1))
ds =0,
where the second equality follows from f 02 (0) = 0. Next, from (17),
@e2 (;W  W 1; 0)
@
=
(W  W 1)C 0()
K 002

(K 02)
 1 ((W  W 1)C())
 .
Hence,
@e2 (;W  W 1; 0)
@

=0
=
(W  W 1)C 0 (0)
K 002

(K 02)
 1 ((W  W 1)C (0))
= 0,
where the second equality follows from (10).
To see that  < 0 is never optimal, note that Lemma (4) (i)-(iii) implies that
for every  < 0,   > 0 yields strictly higher rst-period e¤orts and equally high
second-period e¤orts. Thus, for any revelation policy and whether e¤orts are
perfect or imperfect substitutes, the optimal  is non-negative.
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To see that for W1< W the optimal  is positive, note that by Lemma (5) (i)
and (ii), increasing  marginally from zero increases rst-period e¤orts, while there
is no e¤ect on second-period e¤orts. Hence, for any revelation policy and whether
e¤orts are perfect or imperfect substitutes, the optimal  is positive provided
W1< W .
8.3.2 Proof of Proposition 5
From (18),
@V P (;W 1; 1)
@
=
@e1 (;W 1;W  W 1)
@
+
@E (e2 (1;W  W 1; 1))
@
(42)
Using (C1) and (7) to simplify (40) and (41), (42) becomes
@V P (;W 1)
@
=
(W  W 1)
 
C() + C 0()

k1
+
(W  W 1)C 0()
k2
(43)
Solving @V
P (;W 1)
@
= 0 and rearranging gives the result.
8.4 Optimal Prize Structure for Perfect Substitutes
First, we provide results on the optimal prize structure for the case of general K1
and K2 that are not necessarily quadratic. As the revelation policy matters in
this case, we rst address the optimal prize structure for the full revelation case
in Proposition 9. The result will rely on the Assumption that K 000t  0. This is
not a serious restriction: Corollary 3 states that K 0002  0 is the case in which full
revelation is optimal. Second, we consider the no revelation case in Proposition
10 for K 000t  0. Again, this is not a serious restriction because for K 0002  0 no
revelation is optimal by Corollary 3. Third, we derive Corollary 4 for K 000t = 0.
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8.4.1 Full Revelation
Proposition 9 Suppose K 000t  0 for t = 1; 2. For all > 0, WP1 (; 1)=0
(WP1 (; 1)= W ) if and only if
Wf 1 (0)< (>)K
0
1

(K 01)
 1
(WC()) +2
Z 1
0
(K 02)
 1
(f2 (s)W ) f1 (s) ds

.
(44)
Proof. Using (13) and (14) in (18) gives
V P (;W 1; 1) = (K
0
1)
 1
(f1 (0)W1+ (W  W 1)C()) (45)
+2
Z 1
0
(K 02)
 1
(f2 (s) (W  W 1)) f1 (s) ds.
This yields
@V P (;W 1; 1)
@W 1
=
f1 (0) C()
K 001

(K 01)
 1 (f1 (0)W1+ (W  W 1)C(())

 2
Z 1
0
f2 (s) f1 (s)
K 002

(K 02)
 1 (f2 (s) (W  W 1))
ds,
and hence
@2V P (;W 1; 1)
@W 21
=
 K
000
1

(K 01)
 1 (f1 (0)W1+ (W  W 1)C ())

(f1 (0) C())2 
K 001

(K 01)
 1 (f1 (0)W1+ (W  W 1)C())
3
 2
Z 1
0
(f2 (s))
2K 0002

(K 02)
 1 (f2 (s) (W  W 1))

f1 (s) ds 
K 002

(K 02)
 1 (f2 (s) (W  W 1))
3 :
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Since K 000t > 0, K
000
t  0 implies @
2V P (;W 1;1)
(@W 1)
2  0. Thus, there is no interior
optimum. For W 1=0 and W 1=W , the principals expected payo¤s are
V P (; 0; 1) = (K 01)
 1
(WC()) +2
Z 1
0
(K 02)
 1
(f2 (s)W ) f1 (s) ds;
V P (;W; 1) = (K 01)
 1
(f1 (0)W ) .
Therefore,
V P (; 0; 1) V P (;W; 1) =
(K 01)
 1
(WC ()) +2
Z 1
0
(K 02)
 1
(f2 (s)W ) f1 (s) ds  (K 01) 1 (f1 (0)W ) .
Hence, V P (; 0; 1) V P (;W; 1)> (<)0 if and only if (44) holds.
8.4.2 No Revelation
For the no revelation case, we again restrict the third derivative of the cost func-
tions in such a way that the revelation policy is optimal by Corollary 3.
Proposition 10 Suppose K 000t  0 for t = 1; 2. For all  > 0
(i) WP1 (; 0)=0 if
f1 (0) C ()
K 001

(K 01)
 1 (WC ())
  C ()
K 002

(K 02)
 1 (WC ())
< 0: (46)
(ii) WP1 (; 0)=W if
f1 (0) C ()
K 001

(K 01)
 1 (f1 (0)W )
  C ()
K 002 (0)
> 0: (47)
(iii) If neither (46) nor (47) holds, WP1 2 [0;W ].
Proof. Using (16) and (17) in (18) gives
V P (;W 1; 0) = (48)
(K 01)
 1
(f1 (0)W1+ (W  W 1)C()) + (K 02) 1 ((W  W 1)C ()) .
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This yields
@V P (;W 1; 0)
@W 1
=
f1 (0) C ()
K 001

(K 01)
 1 (f1 (0)W1+ (W  W 1)C ())
  C ()
K 002

(K 02)
 1 ((W  W 1)C ())

and
@2V P (;W 1; 0)
@W 21
=
 (f1 (0) C ())
2 K 0001

(K 01)
 1 (f1 (0)W1+ (W  W 1)C ())
 
K 001

(K 01)
 1 (f1 (0)W1+ (W  W 1)C ())
3
 (C ())
2 K 0002

(K 02)
 1 ((W  W 1)C ())
 
K 002

(K 02)
 1 ((W  W 1)C ())
3
Since K 00t > 0, K
000
t  0 implies @
2V P (;W 1;0)
(@W 1)
2  0.
(i) Thus, the principal will set W 1=0 provided
@V P (;W 1; 0)
@W 1

W1=0
=
f1 (0) C ()
K 001

(K 01)
 1 (WC ())
  C ()
K 002

(K 02)
 1 (WC ())
< 0:
(ii) She will set W 1=W provided
@V P (;W 1; 0)
@W 1

W1=W
=
f1 (0) C ()
K 001

(K 01)
 1 (f1 (0)W )
  C ()
K 002 (0)
> 0.
8.4.3 Proof of Corollary 4
(i) With K 000t = 0, Proposition 9 implies thatW
P
1 () always is a boundary solution,
withW P1 () = 0 if
1
k1
(f1 (0)W ) <


k1
+ 1
k2

WC (). This gives the rst result.
Note that the left-hand side of the last equation is total e¤ort for W1= W , while
the right-hand side is total e¤ort for some  and W1= 0. Hence, if the inequality
is satised for some , then total e¤ort for this  and W1= 0 is higher than for
W1= W , which shows that W1= W cannot be optimal. In this case, since there
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is no interior optimum by Proposition 9, W1= 0 is optimal.47
(ii) analogous.
8.5 Optimal Prize Structure for Imperfect Substitutes
8.5.1 Proof of Proposition 6
Using (13) and (14) in (19) yields
V I (1;W 1; 1) = (K
0
1)
 1
(f1 (0)W1+ (W  W 1)C())  (49)
2
Z 1
0
(K 02)
 1
(f2 (s) (W  W 1)) f1 (s) ds.
Using (49), we have
@V I (;W 1; 1)
@W 1
= (50)
2 (f1 (0) C ())
R1
0
(K 02)
 1 (f2 (s) (W  W 1)) f1 (s) ds
K 001

(K 01)
 1 (f1 (0)W1+ (W  W 1)C ())

 2 (K 01) 1 (f1 (0)W1+ (W  W 1)C ()) Z 1
0
f2 (s)
K 002

(K 02)
 1 (f2 (s) (W  W 1))
f1 (s) ds.
47This can also be derived from Proposition 10.
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Thus,
@2V I (;W 1; 1)
(@W 1)
2 =
 2 (f1 (0) C ())
2 K 0001

(K 01)
 1 (f1 (0)W1+ (W  W 1)C ())
 
K 001

(K 01)
 1 (f1 (0)W1+ (W  W 1)C ())
3 Z 1
0
(K 02)
 1
(f2 (s) (W  W 1)) f1 (s) ds
  4 (f1 (0) C ())
K 001

(K 01)
 1 (f1 (0)W1+ (W  W 1)C ())
 Z 1
0
f2 (s) f1 (s) ds
K 002

(K 02)
 1 (f2 (s) (W  W 1))

  (K 01) 1 (f1 (0)W1+ (W  W 1)C ())  2
Z 1
0
(f2 (s))
2 
K 002

(K 02)
 1 (f2 (s) (W  W 1))
3 
K 0002
h
(K 02)
 1
(f2 (s) (W  W 1))
i
f1 (s) ds.
Since V I (;W; 1)=0, W 1=W is never optimal. Since K 00t > 0, K
000
t  0 implies
@2V I(;W 1;1)
@W 21
> 0 if f1 (0) C() < 0. For this case, there is no interior optimum
and thus W 1=0.
8.5.2 Proof of Proposition 7
With (C1), (49) yields
V I (;W 1) =
(W  W 1)C ()
k1k2
(f1 (0)W1+ (W  W 1)C ()) . (51)
Thus
@V I (;W 1)
@W 1
=
C ()
k1k2
[f1 (0) (W   2W 1) 2C () (W  W 1)] . (52)
Because  > 0, C () > 0 and kt> 0, W 1>12W implies
@V I(;W 1)
@W 1
< 0. Hence,
W 1<
W
2
8 .
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8.5.3 Proof of Proposition 8
(i) Clearly W1> 0 at the optimum if
@V I(;W 1)
@W 1

W1=0
> 0, that is, using (52), if
f1 (0)> 2C (). To see that W1= 0 at the optimum if
@V I(;W 1)
@W 1

W1=0
< 0 or,
equivalently, f1 (0)< 2C (), rst note that (52) implies
@2V I (;W 1)
@W 21
=
C ()
k1k2
[ 2f 1 (0) +2C ()] .
Thus @V
I(;W 1)
@W 1
is monotone in W1. Moreover, according to the proof of Proposi-
tion 7, @V
I(;W 1)
@W 1
< 0 8W 1 > W2 . The last two statements imply that, whenever
@V I(;W 1)
@W 1

W1=0
< 0, then @V
I(;W 1)
@W 1
< 0 for allW1  W2 and thusW I1 () = 0. To
see that W1= 0 at the optimum if
@V I(;W 1)
@W 1

W1=0
= 0 or, equivalently, f1 (0) =
2C (), note that f1 (0) = 2C () implies
@2V I(;W 1)
@W 21
< 0, so that @V
I(;W 1)
@W 1
< 0
8W 1> 0 and thus W I1 () = 0.
For @V
I(;W 1)
@W 1

W1=0
> 0, the rst-order condition @V
I(;W 1)
@W 1
= 0 yieldsW I1 () =
W f1(0) 2C()
2f1(0) 2C()> 0 for f1 (0)> 2C(). Summing up, we obtain
W I1 () =
(
W f1(0) 2C()
2f1(0) 2C() > 0; f1 (0)> 2C ()
0; f1 (0) 2C ()
(53)
(ii) (53) shows that W I1 must correspond to one of the two cases mentioned
in the proposition. To complete the proof, we derive the rst-order condition for
I (W1) for these two cases. From (51), we obtain
@V I (;W 1)
@
=
(W  W 1)2C ()
k1k2
 
C () + C 0()

+ (54)
(W  W 1)C 0 ()
k1k2
(f1 (0)W1+ (W  W 1)C ()) .
The rst-order condition @V
I(;W 1)
@
=0 yields
W1= W
(C ())2 +2C ()C 0()
C ()2+2C ()C 0()  f 1 (0)C 0 ()
. (55)
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According to (53), W1= 0 is a necessary condition for an optimum with f1 (0)
2C(). Inserting W1= 0 in (55) gives the rst-order condition  =   C()2C0() ,
which corresponds to Proposition 8(ii)(a). Analogously, W1= W
f1(0) 2C()
2f1(0) 2C() is a
necessary condition for an optimum with f1 (0)> 2C(). Inserting
W1= W
f1(0) 2C()
2f1(0) 2C() in (55) and solving for f1 (0) gives the rst-order condition
f1 (0) =   (C())
2
C0() , which corresponds to Proposition 8(ii)(b).
8.6 The Normal-Quadratic Example E1
8.6.1 Proof of Corollary 5
Part 1: Auxilliary Results
We will rst provide several auxiliary results. Note that 2p

R x
0
exp ( t2) dt is
the error function, for which
2p

Z 1
0
exp
  t2 dt = 1. (56)
Next, for E1,
ft (s) =
1
t
p
2
exp

  s
2
22t

. (57)
Hence,
f 0t (s) =  
1p
2
s
3t
exp

  s
2
22t

; (58)
f 00t (s) =
1p
2
s2   2t
5t
exp

  s
2
22t

;
f 000t (s) =
1p
2
32t s  s3
7t
exp

  s
2
22t

.
As s =  t (the solution to f 00t (s) = 0 and f 000t (s) < 0) maximizes f 0t (x), we
obtain 8x 2 R f 0t (x)    1p2  t3t exp

  2t
22t

and thus
f 0t (x) 
1
2t
p
2 exp(1)
(59)
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Furthermore, (57) implies
Z 1
0
f2 (s) ds =
1
2
p
2
Z 1
0
exp
 
 

sp
22
2!
ds
Substituting s =
p
22
jj t and ds =
p
22
jj dt impliesZ 1
0
f2 (s) ds =
1
jj p
Z 1
0
exp
  t2 dt.
With (56), we get Z 1
0
f2 (s) ds =
1
2 jj . (60)
Next, (57) and (58) implyZ 1
0
f2 (s) f
0
2 (s) ds=  

242
Z 1
0
s  exp

 s
22
22

ds.
Substituting s =
p
t2
jj and ds =
2
2
p
tjjdt and noting that
R1
0
exp ( t) dt = 1, we
obtain Z 1
0
f2 (s) f
0
2 (s) ds= 
1
422
. (61)
Furthermore, (57) implies
C () =
1
12
Z 1
0
exp
0@  sp212+22p
212
!21A ds:
Substituting s =
p
212p
21
2+22
t and ds =
p
212p
21
2+22
dt yields
C () =
p
2

p
21
2+22
Z 1
0
exp
  t2 dt
With (56), we get
C () =
1p
2
p
21
2 + 22
, (62)
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so that
C 0() =   
2
1p
2 (21
2 + 22)
3
2
. (63)
Part 2: Second-Order Conditions
Next, we derive su¢ cient conditions for the second-order conditions to hold.48
Using K 00t (eit) =k, (23) simplies to
f 02 (x)W2< k 8x 2 R (64)
From W 2W and (59),
f 02 (x)W2
W
22
p
2 exp (1)
(65)
(64) and (65) imply that a su¢ cient condition for (23) to hold is
k >
W
22
p
2 exp (1)
(66)
Similarly, (32) can be written as
f 01 (x)W1+W 2
Z 1
0
f2 (s) [f
0
1 (s+ x) f 01 (s  x)] ds (67)
+
W 22
k
Z 1
0
f2 (s) f
0
2 (s) [f
0
1 (s+ x) +f
0
1 (s  x)] ds < k
Using (59), we obtain 8x 2 R
f 01 (x)W1
W1
21
p
2 exp (1)
;
W 2
Z 1
0
f2 (s) [f
0
1 (s+ x) f 01 (s  x)] ds
2W 2
 R1
0
f2 (s) ds

21
p
2 exp (1)
;
W 22
k
Z 1
0
f2 (s) f
0
2 (s) [f
0
1 (s+ x) +f
0
1 (s  x)] ds
2W 22
 R1
0
f2 (s) f
0
2 (s) ds

k21
p
2 exp (1)
.
48We only consider the second-order conditions for the full revelation case.
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This yields an upper bound for the left-hand side of (67):
1
21
p
2 exp (1)

W1+2W 2
 Z 1
0
f2 (s) ds
+2W 22k
 Z 1
0
f2 (s) f
0
2 (s) ds
 .
With (60) and (61), this upper bound can be written as
W1 +W2
21
p
2 exp (1)
+
W 22
k21
2
2 (2)
3
2
p
exp (1)

W
21
p
2 exp (1)
+
W 2
k21
2
2 (2)
3
2
p
exp (1)
.
A su¢ cient condition for (32) to hold is thus
k>
W
21
p
2 exp (1)
+
W 2
k21
2
2 (2)
3
2
p
exp (1)
. (68)
Part 3: Characterizing the equilibrium
Proposition 1 thus characterizes the PBE. As K 0002 = 0, Proposition 3 implies
that e¤orts under both revelation policies are equal in expected value. Inserting
(K 0t)
 1 (x) =x
k
, (57) and (62) in (13) and (14) yields (21) and (22).
8.6.2 Proof of Corollary 6
(i) We rst derive P (W1). With (62) and (63), we obtain
C 0()
C ()
=   
2
1
22+
2
1
2
.
Proposition 5 (i) thus implies 
2
1
22+
2
1
2=
1
1+
as a necessary condition, which
is uniquely (and positively) solved by  =
2
2
21
> 0. Since the optimal  must be
strictly positive by Proposition 4 and since the solution to the necessary con-
dition is unique and positive, the necessary condition is su¢ cient and we have
P (W1) =
22
21
8 W 1< W . Next, we show that W P1 = 0. By Corollary 4, W P1 = 0
if 9 such that f1 (0)< (1 + )C (). From (57) and (62), this condition is
equivalent with 1
1
p
2
< 1+p
2
p
21
2+22
()  >
22
21
 1
2
. In particular, this holds for
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P (W1) =
22
21
. Hence, W P1 = 0 and 
P = P
 
W P1

=
22
21
.
(ii) (62) and (63) yield
C ()2 +C 0 () f1 (0) =
p
221+
2
2 1
2 (221+
2
2)
3
2
> 0 8 .
This is inconsistent with
C0()C()  = C()f1(0) as for  > 0, C0()C()  = C()f1(0) is equivalent
to C ()2 +C 0 () f1 (0) = 0. Therefore, according to Proposition 8(ii)(b),W I1> 0
cannot apply. Hence, Proposition (8)(ii) givesC 0()C ()
= 12
as the necessary condition for I . Using (62) and (63), this can be written as
21
22+
2
1
2
=
1
2
,
which is solved by I=2
1
.
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